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Abstract—Society’s reliance on social media as a primary
source of news has spawned a renewed focus on the spread of
misinformation. In this work, we identify the differences in how
social media accounts identified as bots react to news sources
of varying credibility, regardless of the veracity of the content
those sources have shared. We analyze bot and human responses
annotated using a fine-grained model that labels responses as
being an answer, appreciation, agreement, disagreement, an
elaboration, humor, or a negative reaction. We present key
findings of our analysis into the prevalence of bots, the variety
and speed of bot and human reactions, and the disparity in
authorship of reaction tweets between these two sub-populations.
We observe that bots are responsible for 9-15% of the reactions to
sources of any given type but comprise only 7-10% of accounts
responsible for reaction-tweets; trusted news sources have the
highest proportion of humans who reacted; bots respond with
significantly shorter delays than humans when posting answer-
reactions in response to sources identified as propaganda. Finally,
we report significantly different inequality levels in reaction rates
for accounts identified as bots vs not.
I. INTRODUCTION
Misinformation spread in social networks has become a
critical focus as users rely on these platforms as a primary
source of news [11]. Current studies in this area have focused
on rumor and misinformation detection with a primary focus
on the network’s role in information diffusion models [9], [10],
[13], [26]. Other studies compare the behavior of traditional
and alternative media [17], classify media sources into sub-
categories of misinformation [22], or attempt to detect rumor-
spreading users [14]. These and other studies have found that
the size and shape of (mis)information cascades within a social
network depends heavily on the initial reactions of the users.
Yet, we still lack an understanding of how users (human and
automated alike) react to news sources of varying credibility
and how their various response types contribute to the spread
of (mis)information. The present work aims to fill this gap by
labelling bot and human users’ reactions to (mis)information
posted by various news sources to measure how bot and human
user reactions to deceptive news sources differ from their
responses to trusted news sources.
Instead of focusing on user reactions to individual news
stories, the current work compares human-user and bot reac-
tions to news sources of varying credibility. We focus on how
behavior of bot and human users differ in four specific areas:
1) concentration of reactions to news sources of each level
of credibility, i.e., are bots responsible for a larger proportion
of the reactions for one class of news sources over another?
(prevalence of bots), 2) the variety of reactions each class
of news sources evoke, (reaction variety), 3) the speed with
which reactions are posted, (reaction speed), and 4) how
equally the volume of reactions are spread across the set of
users who reacted (reaction inequality).
II. RELATED WORK
Prevalence of Bots. Previous studies have identified the
widespread presence of automated accounts or “bots” on social
media. A 2014 filing from Twitter acknowledged that 8.5
percent of its active monthly users were automated accounts1
and subsequent studies found this to be a low estimate
of the actual prevalence of bot accounts [1], [20]. Recent
work has found that accounts spreading disinformation are
significantly more likely to be automated accounts [16]. Other
studies highlight evidence of bot participation in political
discussion [5], [12], [25] and astroturf campaigns that present
the appearance of widespread support of a candidate, opinion,
or topic artificially [15]. A 2018 Pew Research center study
found that the majority (66%) of links tweeted to popular
news sites are posted by accounts that are likely to be bots,
i.e., whose behavior is more similar to bot accounts than to
humans [24]. We seek to answer whether similar trends hold
among reactions to news sources.
Reaction Variety. Linguistic markers have been found to be
effective for early detection of rumors in social networks.
For example, Kwon et al. [9] demonstrated better detection
performance of rumors on Twitter by using user and linguistic
features rather than structural or temporal network features.
Similarly, Zhao et al. [29] identified clusters of tweets that
contain disputed claims by searching for fact-checking lan-
guage. Recently, Zhang et al. [28] classified Reddit comments
into eight types including agreement, answer, appreciation,
disagreement, elaboration, humor, negative reaction, and ques-
tion, and analyzed patterns from these discussions arranged by
1https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000156459014003474/
twtr-10q 20140630.htm? ga=1.155500795.1900968760.1407851022
various subreddits. Our work goes one step further and em-
ploys information credibility classifiers like those mentioned
above in order to better understand how (and how fast) human
users and bots react to information posted by news sources of
varying credibility.
Reaction Speed. Information diffusion studies have often
used epidemiological models, originally formulated to model
the spread of disease within a population, in the context of
social media [6], [18], [27]. In this context, users are infected
when they spread information to other users. A recent study
by Vosoughi et al. [23] found that news that was fact-
checked (post-hoc) and found to be false had spread faster
and to more people than news items that were fact-checked
and found to be true. In this work, we examine the speed
at which users react to content posted by news sources of
varying credibility and compare the delays of different types
of responses. By contrasting the speed of reactions of different
types, from different types of users (bot and human), and
in response to sources of varying credibility, we are able to
determine whether deceptive or trusted sources have slower
immediate share-times overall and within each combination
of user, reaction, and news source types.
Reaction Inequality. In the context of social media, the 1%
rule and its variants indicate that most users only browse
content while a mere 1% of users contribute new content [4],
[19]. Within the subset of those who actively contribute new
content, Kumar and Geethakumari [8] found a larger disparity
among users who retweeted news from sources that were
identified as spreading disinformation. That is, a small number
of highly active users were responsible for the vast majority
of retweets of disinformation. This study focused only on
keywords related to the events in Egypt and Syria in 2013.
To answer this research question more generally, the present
work quantifies and compares the disparity in sharing behavior
of users who frequently reacted to news sources across the
various categories of sources, in particular the disparity within
each of the reaction types. Specifically, for each type of
reaction and each type of news source, we examine whether
reactions from bots and human users who frequently reacted
are equally distributed across the population of users or if there
are a small group of vocal users responsible for the majority
of the reaction-tweets.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANNOTATION
Deceptive news sources that primarily share clickbait, con-
spiracy theories, or propaganda were previously collected by
Volkova et al. [22] from several public resources that annotate
suspicious news accounts.2 The authors also compiled a set
of trusted news sources that tweet in English with Twitter-
verified accounts which were manually labeled. We collected
a set of news sources from https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ that were
identified as a source of disinformation by the European
Union’s East Strategic Communications Task Force. As of
2Deceptive news lists include http://www.fakenewswatch.com/,
http://www.propornot.com/p/the-list.html.
November 2016, EUvsDisinfo reports include almost 1,992
confirmed disinformation campaigns found in news reports
from around Europe and beyond. We limited our set to news
sources identified between 2015 and 2016 [21].
In total, we focused on 282 news sources which were
identified as sources who spread:
• trusted news (T): factual information with no intent to
deceive the audience;
• clickbait (CB): attention-grabbing, misleading, or vague
headlines to attract an audience;
• conspiracy theories (CS): uncorroborated or unreliable
information to explain events or circumstances;
• propaganda (P): intentionally misleading information to
advance a social or political agenda; or
• disinformation (D): fabricated and factually incorrect
information meant to intentionally deceive the audience.
We collected tweets posted between January 2016 and
January 2017 that explicitly @mentioned or directly retweeted
content from one of our 282 sources via the public Twitter API
and assigned a label to each tweet based on the class of the
source @mentioned or retweeted. Then, we focused on the
subset of 4,613,517 tweets identified as English-content in the
Twitter metadata. We further focused on users who frequently
interacted (at least five times) with the news sources we con-
sidered, using tweets posted in any language, which resulted
in 431,771 English-tweets for 255 news sources from 184,248
distinct, frequently interacting users. We then classified each
of the reaction-tweets as an agreement, answer, appreciation,
disagreement, elaboration, humor, negative reaction, question,
or other. To do so, we used linguistically-infused neural
network models [3] trained on a manually annotated reaction
dataset from Zhang et al. [28].
Finally, we gathered botometer scores [2] for each user
who posted a reaction-tweet and partitioned the data into bot
reactions and human-user reactions using a bot-score threshold
of 0.5. That is, human-user reactions were posted by users with
a bot score under the threshold of 0.5 and the bot reactions
dataset comprises tweets posted by users with bot scores at or
above the threshold. A summary of the dataset across source
types is presented in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF ENGLISH REACTIONS FROM USERS WHO REACTED
FREQUENTLY (≥ 5 REACTIONS BETWEEN JAN 2016 AND JAN 2017).
Sources Reactions
Source-Type # Accounts # Tweets # Users # Tweets
Trusted 173 1,633,996 173,098 2,875,120
Clickbait 10 13,764 8,088 22,352
Conspiracy 13 31,584 14,047 80,025
Propaganda 25 81,305 51,160 295,070
Disinformation 34 68,319 26,131 164,040
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the methodology we used to
examine the behavior of bot and human user accounts across
varying reactions and in reaction to news sources of varying
levels of credibility. As previously discussed, we focus on four
specific types of behavior: prevalence of bots, reaction variety,
reaction speed, and the inequality of reaction volume.
First, we examine the prevalence of bots, i.e., the relative
presence of bots in reactions to news sources of each type. We
consider the following two distributions: 1) bot scores of users
who reacted to news sources of a given type and 2) bot scores
associated with reaction-tweets (the bot scores of users who
posted the reaction). The distribution of reaction-users focuses
on the distribution of bot scores over the set of unique users
who reacted, each user is represented once and only once. On
the other hand, users may be represented multiple times in
the distribution of bot scores associated with reaction-tweets,
if they reacted to a news source of a given class multiple
times. With these two distributions of bot scores, we are able
to examine the prevalence of bots within the population of
reacting users and within the population of reactions broadcast.
As a result of our bot classification methodology, we are
able to examine user types using coarse and fine-grained
classifications. We first examine the distributions of bots and
humans users at a coarse granularity with a binary classifica-
tion of users as either a bot or human user account. Then, we
consider a fine-grained distinction using the bot scores of users
and compare the distributions of bot scores for users who react
and of bot scores associated with reaction-tweets (i.e., the bot
score of the user who posted). Mann Whitney U (MWU) tests
that compare distributions across types of sources and types
of users are used to identify statistically significant differences
in these fine-grained distributions.
The next characteristic that we evaluate is the variety of
reactions each class of news source elicits from bots and from
human users. We compare distributions across reaction types
overall and separated them into each category of user. Com-
parisons of reaction variety within each user type allows us to
identify certain reactions, classes of news sources, or reactions
to a class of news source that have higher concentrations of bot
(or human) reactions. Then we consider the tendency of each
user type by comparing the frequencies of each reaction type
across all classes of sources between bot and human users.
Next we examine the speed of reactions. To answer whether
how quickly bots or human users react differs or whether users
react to content from trusted sources faster than from deceptive
sources, we look at reaction delays for each user type, reaction
type, and response to each class of news sources. We define
the reaction delay as the time elapsed between the source tweet
and when the reaction occurred. We compare the cumulative
distribution functions (CDFs) of each user type within and
across each type of source to analyze the delay patterns.
Finally, we compare the inequality in reactions among bots
and human users. That is, how evenly the volume of reaction-
tweets is spread across users of each type; Does each user post
an equal number of reactions? We do so using two measures
that have been commonly used to measure income inequality:
Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients. Rather than measure
how much of the total population’s income each individual
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Fig. 1. Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients. As a graphical representation
of income inequality within a population, Lorenz curves plot the share of
income by the cumulative share of the population. The Gini coefficient is the
proportion of the area under the line of perfect equality (a1 + a2) that is
captured between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve (a1). We
adapt Lorenz curves to measure the inequality in reaction volume by plotting
the share of the total reaction volume, i.e., the y% of reaction-tweets posted,
by the share of the population who reacted, i.e., the cumulative x% of users
ordered by least to most reaction-tweets posted.
is responsible for, we repurpose these metrics to measure
how much of the total reaction-tweet volume each user is
responsible for. This allows us to compare reaction inequality
across source types the way that economists compare income
inequality across countries or regions.
Lorenz curves have traditionally been used to illustrate the
distribution of income or wealth graphically [7]. In those
domains, the curves plot the cumulative percentage of wealth
or income compared against the cumulative (in increasing
shares) percentage of a corresponding population. The degree
to which a Lorenz curve deviates from the straight diagonal
line (y = x) representative of perfect equality represents the
inequality present in the distribution. In our case, the Lorenz
curve is adapted to illustrate the cumulative percentage of
propagation (tweets shared) as a function of the cumulative
percentage of users posting, as shown in Figure 1.
Gˆ = 1−
n∑
k=1
(Xk −Xk−1)(Yk + Yk−1) (1)
The Gini coefficient is defined as the proportion of the area
under the line of perfect equality that is captured above the
Lorenz curve, i.e., a1
a1+a2
in Figure 1. The Gini coefficients
reported in subsequent sections are calculated using the for-
mula in Eq. 1, which is an approximation of the points of the
Lorenz curves observed in the collected data. Using income
as an example, Gini coefficients can grow larger than 1 but
only if individuals within the population can be responsible
for negative shares, that is, if individuals can have negative
incomes. In our data, users must be responsible for at least 1
TABLE II
(PREVALENCE OF BOTS) DISTRIBUTIONS ACROSS BOT ACCOUNTS (BOT
SCORE ≥ 0.5), HUMAN ACCOUNTS (BOT SCORE < 0.5), AND UNKNOWN
ACCOUNTS (FOR WHICH WE COULD NOT COLLECT A BOT SCORE) WITHIN
THE SET OF USERS WHO REACTED (U) AND THE SET OF REACTION
TWEETS (T) FOR EACH CLASS OF NEWS SOURCE. HIGHEST PROPORTIONS
OF EACH USER TYPE ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD AND LOWEST
PROPORTIONS ARE IN ITALICS.
% Bot % Human % Unknown
Source-Type U T U T U T
Trusted 7.47 12.57 77.32 74.46 15.22 13.03
Clickbait 10.17 15.06 74.10 72.62 15.73 12.35
Conspiracy 7.90 8.90 72.79 76.50 19.31 14.62
Propaganda 6.80 11.54 75.00 70.56 18.20 17.94
Disinformation 9.64 13.29 73.11 70.18 17.25 16.65
reaction-tweet in order to be considered part of the dataset, so
Gini coefficients in our analysis have an upper-bound of 1.
V. ANALYSIS
Here we present the key results of our analysis of the
behavior of bots and human users in reaction to news sources
of varying credibility: the prevalence of reactions from bots
and the variety, speed, and the inequality in volume of reaction
tweets evoked by each class of news source.
A. Prevalence of Bots
In this subsection, we consider the prevalence of bot users
among the audience and reactions broadcast to the community.
The distributions of users across bot, human, and unknown
(accounts for which we could not collect bot scores) within
each class of news source are presented in Table II.
As shown in Table II, bots are responsible for approximately
9-15% of the reactions to sources of any given type but only
comprise around 7-10% of users responsible for reaction-
tweets. We see that although conspiracy sources have the low-
est presence of human users within the population of users who
react, they have the highest proportion of reactions authored by
human-users. Trusted news sources have the highest relative
presence of human users. Interestingly, disinformation news
sources have only the second highest proportions of bots for
users who reacted as well as reaction tweets posted. Instead,
clickbait news sources have the highest presence of bots with
10.17% of users who were responsible for 15.06% of the
reaction-tweets for clickbait sources identified as bots.
Figure 2 illustrates the distributions of bot scores of users
who reacted (left) and the scores associated with reaction-
tweets, i.e., the bot score of the user who posted the tweet,
(right). When we compare distributions of users’ bot scores
across classes of news sources, we find statistically significant
differences. Mann Whitney U comparisons identified signifi-
cant (p < 0.01) differences between distributions for clickbait
and trusted or propaganda news sources, where reactions and
users who post reactions to clickbait sources have higher bot
scores, on average, than trusted or propaganda news sources.
Although the distributions of bot scores of unique users and
scores associated with reaction tweets are not statistically
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Fig. 2. (Prevalence of Bots) Bot score distributions, using a bin width of
0.05, for users who reacted (left) and reaction-tweets (right). Mann Whitney
U comparisons of raw distributions found that the average bot score of a user
who posted a reaction-tweet is higher (p < 0.01) than the average bot score
of a user who reacted for all source types except for Conspiracy-sources,
where the average bot score of a user who posted a reaction-tweet is lower
(p < 0.01).
significant, the slight changes in the shape of the distributions,
e.g., between the two distributions for Conspiracy sources,
paired with the discrepancies in Table II hint at the inequality
of reaction tweet volume. That is, they indicate that reactions
are not evenly spread across users. We investigate this further
in our analysis of reaction inequality.
B. Reaction Variety
We plot the distributions of reaction-types for each of the
five classes of news sources in Figure 3 and the distribution
across bot, human, and unknown users for each source class
and reaction type combination for the most frequent reaction
types in Table III. When we compare the distributions of
reaction types, we see that the most common reaction types
(i.e., present in ≥ 10% of reactions) are answer, elaboration,
question, and “other” across all classes of media. In Figure 4
we present the relative frequencies of the most common
reactions within the reaction-tweets posted by a given user
type in response to news sources of a given class. These plots
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0
20
40
60
%
re
ac
ti
o
n
s
Trusted Clickbait Conspiracy Propaganda Disinfo
Fig. 3. (Reaction Variety) Distributions of predicted reaction-types within tweets that directly responded to sources of each source-type.
TABLE III
(REACTION VARIETY) PROPORTIONS OF REACTIONS POSTED BY BOT, HUMAN, OR UNKNOWN USERS FOR EACH SOURCE CLASS AND REACTION TYPE
COMBINATION FOR THE MOST FREQUENT REACTION TYPES. SOURCE CLASS(ES)WITH THE LOWEST PROPORTIONS FOR EACH USER TYPE ARE
HIGHLIGHTED WITH BOLD FOR EACH OF THE REACTION TYPES.
Answer Elaboration Question Other
B H U B H U B H U B H U
Trusted 0.16 0.69 0.15 0.10 0.77 0.13 0.12 0.75 0.13 0.12 0.74 0.14
Clickbait 0.24 0.66 0.11 0.11 0.76 0.13 0.12 0.75 0.13 0.12 0.76 0.12
Conspiracy 0.09 0.75 0.16 0.09 0.77 0.14 0.08 0.79 0.13 0.09 0.74 0.17
Propaganda 0.25 0.57 0.17 0.09 0.73 0.18 0.10 0.71 0.19 0.09 0.73 0.19
Disinformation 0.15 0.68 0.17 0.12 0.71 0.16 0.12 0.71 0.16 0.14 0.70 0.16
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Fig. 4. (Reaction Variety) Frequencies of most common reaction-types within
reactions to news sources of each class posted by bot accounts (above) and
human user accounts (below), as a percentage of reactions posted by accounts
within each population.
focus more closely on how reaction frequencies differ within
a single user-type population.
When we examine the distributions of each class, we find
several key differences in the variety of reactions elicited.
Conspiracy news sources have the highest relative rate of elab-
oration responses, i.e., “On the next day, radiation level has
gone up. [url]”, with a more pronounced difference within the
bot population. Conspiracy news sources also have the lowest
relative rate of answer reactions within the bot population, but
not within human users. Clickbait news sources, on the other
hand, have the highest relative rate of answer reactions and
the lowest rate of question reactions across both populations
of user types.
Conspiracy and propaganda news sources have higher rates
of human question-reactions than they do human answer-
reactions; human users who react to these types of news
sources question content from the source more often than
they respond with an answer. While we see a similar trend
within human users for conspiracy sources, we see a higher
relative rate of answer reactions to propaganda sources when
we examine relative rates of bot reactions.
C. Reaction Speed
Next, we study the speed with which bot and human users
react to news sources. CDF plots for reaction delays of the
most frequently occurring reactions are shown in Figure 5.
These plots illustrate the percentage of reactions that occur
within the first x hours after a source posted the original
content users reacted to. As expected, a large proportion of
the reaction activity occurs soon after a news source posts
across all reaction and source type combinations.
Mann Whitney U tests that compared distributions of re-
action delays found that humans elaborate on and question
content from clickbait sources faster than bots do (p < 0.01).
This is reflected in Figure 5 where we see the CDF curve
for humans pulls above the curve for bots due to the heavier
concentration (at least 80%) of reactions with very short (≤ 6
hours) delays, compared to bot users with approximately 60-
70% of reactions that occurred within the first 6 hours. We
see similar trends for all the other combinations of reaction
and source types but a few notable exceptions. In the case
of answer-reactions in response to content from propaganda
news sources, bots respond with significantly shorter delays
than human users do (p < 0.01). MWU tests comparing bot
and human answer-reactions to clickbait and disinformation
sources were not found to differ with statistical significance.
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Fig. 5. (Reaction Speed) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) plots of the volumes of reactions by reaction delays in hours (i.e., the delay between when
a source posted content and when the reaction tweet was posted) for bots and human user accounts for the most frequently occurring reactions (occurring in
at least 10% of tweets) for each source-type, using a step size of one day.
D. Reaction Inequality
Finally, we investigate reaction inequality to answer the
question: does each user share an equal number of reactions,
or are some user or users responsible for a disproportionate
number of the reaction tweets for each of the most common
reaction types (answer, elaboration, question, and “other”) ?
In Figure 6 we present the Lorenz curves for bots and human
users when we consider populations with reaction tweets for
each combination of reaction type and class of source.
There are significant differences (MWU p < 0.01) between
the Lorenz curves for bot and human users for all combinations
of reaction and source types except for elaboration reactions to
clickbait news sources and elaboration, question, and “other”
reactions to conspiracy sources. In these cases, human users
are also unevenly responsible for reaction tweets, i.e., a subset
of the human users are responsible for a disproportionate
number of the human-reactions, and the disparity between
users who react infrequently and those who post a substantial
number of reactions is similar to those within the correspond-
ing populations of bot users.
When users reacted to conspiracy sources, the volume
of reaction tweets are similarly unequally distributed across
users within the populations of bots and human users except
for answer-reactions. Answer-reactions posted in response to
conspiracy sources have a smaller prolific subset of bot users
responsible for an unexpectedly large volume of the reaction
tweets. Human users also respond unevenly with a subset of
users who post a disproportionate amount of the reactions,
but to a lesser extent than the population of bot users who
posted reactions. We see similar patterns across all significant
comparisons. That is, bot populations, if significantly different
from the corresponding human user population, always have
a higher level of disparity in reaction volumes than the
corresponding human users.
Table IV presents the increases in Gini coefficient from
the human user to bot populations. For clarity, we present
only the significant increases (p < 0.05) with dashes (−) in
place of results without significance. Increases are presented
in both absolute terms and relative to the Gini coefficient of
the human user population. The most extreme difference is
seen in answer-reaction to propaganda sources, with the bot
population having a Gini coefficient 58.6% (+0.34) larger than
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Bots (Bot Score ≥ 0.5) Human (Bot Score < 0.5) Lorenz Curve of Perfect Equality
Fig. 6. (Reaction Inequality) Lorenz curves for each of the frequently occurring reactions (occurring in at least 5% of tweets) for each source-type. These
Lorenz curves plot the share of reactions by the cumulative share of the population (bots, humans, or accounts without bot scores) as a graphical representation
of inequality in reaction volume within each population. The gray dash-dotted line reflects the Lorenz curve that would result from a population wherein
each user was responsible for an equal number of reactions. Gini coefficients for bot (B) and human (H) accounts and statistical significance results of Mann
Whitney U (MWU) comparisons of Lorenz curves are listed in the top left corner of each subplot. ** if p < 0.01, * if p < 0.05, and − if p ≥ 0.05. Lorenz
curves and Gini coefficients are presented faded where there are no significant differences between bot an human users.
TABLE IV
(REACTION INEQUALITY) THE DIFFERENCE (∆) IF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (MWU p < 0.01) BETWEEN GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR BOT (B) AND
HUMAN (H) USER ACCOUNTS AND THE RELATIVE INCREASE (%∆) FROM THE HUMAN USER TO BOT GINI COEFFICIENT, i.e., (B-H)/H. A DASH (−) IS
SHOWN IF NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE WAS FOUND (p ≥ 0.05). HIGHEST RELATIVE INCREASES ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD WITHIN SOURCE TYPES
AND ITALICIZED WITHIN REACTION TYPES.
Trusted Clickbait Conspiracy Propaganda Disinfo
Reaction ∆ %∆ ∆ %∆ ∆ %∆ ∆ %∆ ∆ %∆
Answer 0.15 21.74 0.21 38.89 0.12 19.05 0.34 58.62 0.11 16.42
Elaboration 0.09 18.00 — — — — 0.07 12.96 0.04 5.63
Question 0.12 25.53 0.13 40.63 — — 0.16 34.78 0.05 9.80
Other 0.11 28.95 0.09 31.03 — — 0.10 25.64 0.05 9.62
human users do. We find that the highest relative increases
for the more deceptive news source classes (conspiracy,
propaganda, and disinformation) occur when we compared
answer-reactions. The highest relative increase for elaboration
reactions occurs within elaboration-reactions to trusted news
sources. The highest relative increase in inequality for reac-
tions to trusted news source, however, occurs within the class
of “other” reactions, i.e., reactions that our annotation model
did not predict to be one of the eight reaction types. In contrast,
we see the lowest significant relative differences between
human and bot users in reactions to disinformation sources.
We see that the Gini coefficients for bots are only 5.6% higher
than humans for elaboration-reactions, and approximately 10%
higher for both question-reactions and other-reactions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a novel analysis of bot and human-
user reactions to sources of varying levels of credibility
using fine-grained reaction labels. We identified several key
differences in the prevalence of bots within reactions and
populations of users who reacted, the variety of reactions each
news source evokes, the speed with which different reactions
occurred and the inequality of participation in the set of
reactions. Future work will focus on further exploration of the
differences in evolution of the response to deceptive sources,
an expanded analysis that incorporates both frequent and
infrequently reacting users, and comparisons across multiple
platforms e.g., Facebook and Reddit.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Twitter data used for the analysis in this paper was collected
using public Twitter API and analyzed over the period of
01/2016 – 01/2017. Botometer data was collected by the
University of Notre Dame using public APIs. The research
was supported by the Laboratory Directed Research and De-
velopment Program at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
a multiprogram national laboratory operated by Battelle for the
U.S. Department of Energy. This research is also supported by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
contract W911NF-17-C-0094. The U.S. Government is autho-
rized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental
purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation thereon.
The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily represent-
ing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or
implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
REFERENCES
[1] Z. Chu, S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, and S. Jajodia, “Who is tweeting
on twitter: Human, bot, or cyborg?” in Proceedings of the 26th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference, ser. ACSAC ’10. ACM,
2010, pp. 21–30.
[2] C. A. Davis, O. Varol, E. Ferrara, A. Flammini, and F. Menczer,
“Botornot: A system to evaluate social bots,” in Proceedings of the 25th
International Conference Companion on World Wide Web. International
World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2016, pp. 273–274.
[3] M. Glenski, T. Weninger, and S. Volkova, “Identifying and understanding
user reactions to deceptive and trusted social news sources,” in ACL,
2018.
[4] E. Hargittai and G. Walejko, “The participation divide: content creation
and sharing in the digital age,” Information, Community and Society,
vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 239–256, 2008.
[5] P. N. Howard and B. Kollany, “Bots,# strongerin and# brexit: Com-
putational propaganda during the uk-eu referendum,” Social Science
Research Network, 2016.
[6] F. Jin, E. Dougherty, P. Saraf, Y. Cao, and N. Ramakrishnan, “Epidemi-
ological modeling of news and rumors on twitter,” in Social Network
Mining and Analysis, 2013.
[7] N. C. Kakwani and N. Podder, “On the estimation of lorenz curves
from grouped observations,” International Economic Review, pp. 278–
292, 1973.
[8] K. K. Kumar and G. Geethakumari, “Detecting misinformation in online
social networks using cognitive psychology,” Human-centric Computing
and Information Sciences, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 14, 2014.
[9] S. Kwon, M. Cha, and K. Jung, “Rumor detection over varying time
windows,” PloS one, vol. 12, no. 1, p. e0168344, 2017.
[10] S. Kwon, M. Cha, K. Jung, W. Chen, and Y. Wang, “Prominent features
of rumor propagation in online social media,” in Proceedings of ICDM,
2013.
[11] D. M. Lazer, M. A. Baum, Y. Benkler, A. J. Berinsky, K. M. Greenhill,
F. Menczer, M. J. Metzger, B. Nyhan, G. Pennycook, D. Rothschild
et al., “The science of fake news,” Science, vol. 359, no. 6380, pp.
1094–1096, 2018.
[12] P. T. Metaxas and E. Mustafaraj, “Social media and the elections,”
Science, vol. 338, no. 6106, pp. 472–473, 2012.
[13] V. Qazvinian, E. Rosengren, D. R. Radev, and Q. Mei, “Rumor has it:
Identifying misinformation in microblogs,” in Proceedings of EMNLP,
2011.
[14] B. Rath, W. Gao, J. Ma, and J. Srivastava, “From retweet to believability:
Utilizing trust to identify rumor spreaders on twitter,” in Proceedings of
ASONAM, 2017.
[15] J. Ratkiewicz, M. Conover, M. R. Meiss, B. Gonc¸alves, A. Flammini,
and F. Menczer, “Detecting and tracking political abuse in social media.”
ICWSM, vol. 11, pp. 297–304, 2011.
[16] C. Shao, G. L. Ciampaglia, O. Varol, A. Flammini, and F. Menczer, “The
spread of fake news by social bots,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07592,
2017.
[17] K. Starbird, “Examining the alternative media ecosystem through the
production of alternative narratives of mass shooting events on twitter,”
in ICWSM, 2017.
[18] M. Tambuscio, G. Ruffo, A. Flammini, and F. Menczer, “Fact-checking
effect on viral hoaxes: A model of misinformation spread in social
networks,” in WWW, 2015.
[19] T. van Mierlo, “The 1% rule in four digital health social networks: An
observational study,” J Med Internet Res, vol. 16, no. 2, p. e33, Feb
2014.
[20] O. Varol, E. Ferrara, C. A. Davis, F. Menczer, and A. Flammini, “Online
human-bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and characterization,” in
ICWSM, 2017.
[21] S. Volkova and J. Y. Jang, “Misleading or falsification: Inferring
deceptive strategies and types in online news and social media,” in
Companion of the The Web Conference 2018 on The Web Conference
2018. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee,
2018, pp. 575–583.
[22] S. Volkova, K. Shaffer, J. Y. Jang, and N. Hodas, “Separating facts from
fiction: Linguistic models to classify suspicious and trusted news posts
on twitter,” in ACL, 2017.
[23] S. Vosoughi, D. Roy, and S. Aral, “The spread of true and false news
online,” Science, vol. 359, no. 6380, pp. 1146–1151, 2018. [Online].
Available: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146
[24] S. Wojcik, S. Messing, A. Smith, L. Rainie, and P. Hitlin, “Bots in
the twittersphere,” http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/04/09/bots-in-the-
twittersphere/, 2018.
[25] S. C. Woolley, “Automating power: Social bot interference in global
politics,” First Monday, vol. 21, no. 4, 2016.
[26] K. Wu, S. Yang, and K. Q. Zhu, “False rumors detection on sina weibo
by propagation structures,” in ICDE. IEEE, 2015.
[27] L. Wu, F. Morstatter, X. Hu, and H. Liu, “Mining misinformation in
social media,” Big Data in Complex and Social Networks, 2016.
[28] A. Zhang, B. Culbertson, and P. Paritosh, “Characterizing online discus-
sion using coarse discourse sequences,” in ICWSM, 2017.
[29] Z. Zhao, P. Resnick, and Q. Mei, “Enquiring minds: Early detection of
rumors in social media from enquiry posts,” in Proceedings of WWW,
2015.
